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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-10T16:22:59.839722+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47412</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47412</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T16:23:00.507307+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47412"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g8rr-7rj2-f627</id>
    <title>GHSA-g8rr-7rj2-f627 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T16:23:00.507413+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86; `services/workspace_service.py`'s `delete()` method.
**Root cause:** the route uses `Depends(require_workspace_member)` which defaults to `min_role="member"` and is never overridden. The service method `WorkspaceService.delete(workspace_id)` performs the destructive operation without any caller-permission verification. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`, member_service.py:80-96) is implemented but unused for this endpoint.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86.</p>
<p>```python
@router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_workspace(
    workspace_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
    deleted = awai…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g8rr-7rj2-f627"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2934</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2934 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can delete the entire workspace via DELETE /workspaces/{id}</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T16:23:00.507542+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling destructive action. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member of the workspace can issue a single DELETE to wipe the entire workspace, including every project, issue, comment, agent, label, and member record (cascading via the foreign-key relationships). There is no owner-role gate, no confirmation token, no soft-delete window, no recovery path.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86; `services/workspace_service.py`'s `delete()` method.
**Root cause:** the route uses `Depends(require_workspace_member)` which defaults to `min_role="member"` and is never overridden. The service method `WorkspaceService.delete(workspace_id)` performs the destructive operation without any caller-permission verification. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`, member_service.py:80-96) is implemented but unused for this endpoint.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 77-86.</p>
<p>```python
@router.delete("/{workspace_id}", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def delete_workspace(
    workspace_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # &lt;-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)
    deleted = awai…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2934"/>
  </entry>
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