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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T18:10:26.497429+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47395</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47395</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:10:26.559945+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, PraisonAI's direct-prompt CLI automatically expands `@url:` mentions in raw prompt text before agent execution begins. If a prompt contains `@url:&lt;http-or-https-url&gt;`, the CLI calls `MentionsParser.process(...)`. The `@url:` handler then performs a direct `urllib.request.urlopen()` request to the attacker-controlled URL and returns the response body. That response body is prepended to the final model prompt context. There is no loopback/private-address restriction, no metadata-service restriction, and no approval gate before the fetch. As a result, attacker-influenced prompt text can cause the operator's machine to fetch localhost-only HTTP resources and inject the response into model context. PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain a fix.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47395"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5cxw-77wg-jrf3</id>
    <title>GHSA-5cxw-77wg-jrf3 — PraisonAI CLI automatically resolves @url mentions in prompt text and can read loopback URLs into model context</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:10:26.560037+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonaiagents, PyPI: PraisonAI</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>PraisonAI's direct-prompt CLI automatically expands `@url:` mentions in raw prompt text before agent execution begins.</p>
<p>If a prompt contains `@url:&lt;http-or-https-url&gt;`, the CLI calls `MentionsParser.process(...)`. The `@url:` handler then performs a direct `urllib.request.urlopen()` request to the attacker-controlled URL and returns the response body. That response body is prepended to the final model prompt context.</p>
<p>There is no loopback/private-address restriction, no metadata-service restriction, and no approval gate before the fetch.</p>
<p>As a result, attacker-influenced prompt text can cause the operator's machine to fetch localhost-only HTTP resources and inject the response into model context.</p>
<p>Example:</p>
<p>```text
@url:http://localhost.:8766/ summarize this
````</p>
<p>This causes PraisonAI to make an HTTP request to the local machine and prepend the fetched response body to the prompt that the model receives.</p>
<p>This is a narrow local SSRF / local content disclosure issue in automatic prompt preprocessing. It is not a remote server takeover.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The affected direct-prompt CLI path is in:</p>
<p>```text
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/main.py
```</p>
<p>The CLI imports and instantiates `MentionsParser` on the direct prompt path:</p>
<p>```python
from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser</p>
<p>parser = MentionsParser(workspace_path=os.getcwd())</p>
<p>if parser.has_mentions(prompt):
    mention_context, prompt = parser.process(prompt)</p>
<p>if mention_context:
    prompt = f"{menti…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5cxw-77wg-jrf3"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2903</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2903 — PraisonAI CLI automatically resolves @url mentions in prompt text and can read loopback URLs into model context</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:10:26.560147+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>PraisonAI's direct-prompt CLI automatically expands `@url:` mentions in raw prompt text before agent execution begins.</p>
<p>If a prompt contains `@url:&lt;http-or-https-url&gt;`, the CLI calls `MentionsParser.process(...)`. The `@url:` handler then performs a direct `urllib.request.urlopen()` request to the attacker-controlled URL and returns the response body. That response body is prepended to the final model prompt context.</p>
<p>There is no loopback/private-address restriction, no metadata-service restriction, and no approval gate before the fetch.</p>
<p>As a result, attacker-influenced prompt text can cause the operator's machine to fetch localhost-only HTTP resources and inject the response into model context.</p>
<p>Example:</p>
<p>```text
@url:http://localhost.:8766/ summarize this
````</p>
<p>This causes PraisonAI to make an HTTP request to the local machine and prepend the fetched response body to the prompt that the model receives.</p>
<p>This is a narrow local SSRF / local content disclosure issue in automatic prompt preprocessing. It is not a remote server takeover.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The affected direct-prompt CLI path is in:</p>
<p>```text
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/main.py
```</p>
<p>The CLI imports and instantiates `MentionsParser` on the direct prompt path:</p>
<p>```python
from praisonaiagents.tools.mentions import MentionsParser</p>
<p>parser = MentionsParser(workspace_path=os.getcwd())</p>
<p>if parser.has_mentions(prompt):
    mention_context, prompt = parser.process(prompt)</p>
<p>if mention_context:
    prompt = f"{menti…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2903"/>
  </entry>
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