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  <updated>2026-10-06T04:20:41.366358+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45723</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-45723</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T04:20:42.029359+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to 1.6.6 and 1.7.3, managementServer.CreateSchematic in internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go passes the caller-controlled TalosVersion field to imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions without validating it as a version. An authenticated Operator can submit traversal segments in TalosVersion, and url.URL.JoinPath normalizes them into unintended paths on the configured image-factory host. Omni then issues HTTP GET requests to those paths and reflects error-body content, enabling same-host endpoint probing and possible disclosure of internal diagnostics while preventing redirection to another host or write requests. This issue is fixed in versions 1.6.6 and 1.7.3.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45723"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c66c-vq6w-fvh5</id>
    <title>GHSA-c66c-vq6w-fvh5 — Omni: Operator can traverse image-factory API paths via unsanitized `talos_version` in CreateSchematic</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T04:20:42.029485+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/siderolabs/omni</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`managementServer.CreateSchematic` (`internal/backend/grpc/schematics.go`) passes the caller-controlled `TalosVersion` field directly to `imageFactoryClient.OverlaysVersions`, which embeds it verbatim into a `fmt.Sprintf("/version/%s/overlays/official", talosVersion)` path template. `url.URL.JoinPath` resolves any `../` sequences in that path, allowing an authenticated Operator to rewrite the URL path and force Omni to issue HTTP GET requests to unintended paths on the configured image-factory server. Error body content from those unintended endpoints is returned to the caller.</p>
<p>## Severity</p>
<p>- **Attack Vector:** Network: exploited via the gRPC `CreateSchematic` API endpoint.
- **Attack Complexity:** Low: once the attacker holds an Operator credential and has identified a media ID with an overlay, exploitation is a single API call.
- **Privileges Required:** High: `role.Operator` is required, which has administrative capabilities on Omni.
- **User Interaction:** None.
- **Scope:** Unchanged: the traversal is constrained to the configured image-factory host; the attacker cannot redirect Omni to an arbitrary external server.
- **Confidentiality Impact:** Low: error body content from unintended image-factory endpoints is reflected back to the operator, potentially leaking server-internal information.
- **Integrity Impact:** None: only HTTP GET requests are issued; no write operations are performed.
- **Availability Impact:** None.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- **Same-host path trave…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c66c-vq6w-fvh5"/>
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