<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-08T17:35:49.476842+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33764</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-33764</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T17:35:49.479420+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the AI plugin's `save.json.php` endpoint loads AI response objects using an attacker-controlled `$_REQUEST['id']` parameter without validating that the AI response belongs to the specified video. An authenticated user with AI permissions can reference any AI response ID — including those generated for other users' private videos — and apply the stolen AI-generated content (titles, descriptions, keywords, summaries, or full transcriptions) to their own video, effectively exfiltrating the information. Commit aa2c46a806960a0006105df47765913394eec142 contains a patch.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33764"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g39v-qrj6-jxrh</id>
    <title>GHSA-g39v-qrj6-jxrh — AVideo: IDOR in AI Plugin Allows Stealing Other Users' AI-Generated Metadata and Transcriptions</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T17:35:49.479498+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: wwbn/avideo</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The AI plugin's `save.json.php` endpoint loads AI response objects using an attacker-controlled `$_REQUEST['id']` parameter without validating that the AI response belongs to the specified video. An authenticated user with AI permissions can reference any AI response ID — including those generated for other users' private videos — and apply the stolen AI-generated content (titles, descriptions, keywords, summaries, or full transcriptions) to their own video, effectively exfiltrating the information.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>In `plugin/AI/save.json.php`, the authorization flow checks that the user can edit the *target video* (`Video::canEdit($videos_id)` at line 23), but loads the AI response object from a completely separate, user-controlled parameter:</p>
<p>**Line 29 — metatags path (no ownership check):**
```php
if(!empty($_REQUEST['ai_metatags_responses_id'])){
    $ai = new Ai_metatags_responses($_REQUEST['id']);  // Loads ANY response by ID
    
    if (empty($ai-&gt;getcompletion_tokens())) {
        forbiddenPage('AI Response not found');
    }
}
```</p>
<p>**Line 146 — transcription path (no ownership check):**
```php
case 'text':
    if(!empty($_REQUEST['ai_transcribe_responses_id'])){
        $ait = new Ai_transcribe_responses($_REQUEST['id']);  // Loads ANY response by ID
        $value = $ait-&gt;getVtt();
```</p>
<p>The `ObjectYPT` base class constructor performs a simple database lookup with no authorization:
```php
public function __construct($id = "", $refreshCache = false) {
    i…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g39v-qrj6-jxrh"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
