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  <updated>2026-09-29T19:14:22.187991+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19671</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-19671</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T19:14:22.265089+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19671"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g</id>
    <title>GHSA-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T19:14:22.265162+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-3wrw-4pcx-6p2g"/>
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