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  <updated>2026-10-04T17:35:39.888282+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-14367</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-14367</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T17:35:39.890050+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The I3C IBI subsystem in drivers/i3c/i3c_ibi_workq.c hands out statically-allocated work nodes through a free-list i3c_ibi_work_nodes_free implemented as a plain sys_slist_t, which provides no synchronization. The allocation helpers (i3c_ibi_work_enqueue, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_target_irq, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_hotjoin, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_controller_request, i3c_ibi_work_enqueue_cb) called sys_slist_get() directly from ISR context, while the workqueue handler i3c_ibi_work_handler() returned nodes with sys_slist_append() from the workqueue thread, with no lock on either side.</p>
<p>Because sys_slist_get() and sys_slist_append() are neither atomic nor interrupt-safe, an IBI interrupt that fires while the workqueue thread is mid-append (or a truly parallel access under CONFIG_SMP) races on the shared list. This corrupts the list linkage: a node may be handed to two consumers, a node may be lost, or the head/tail pointers may be left inconsistent so sys_slist_get() returns a stale or garbage pointer. In the double-hand-out case the subsequent memcpy(ibi_node, ibi_work, sizeof(*ibi_node)) overwrites a node still in flight; a garbage pointer turns the same memcpy into an out-of-bounds write.</p>
<p>The race is driven by I3C bus traffic — IBIs, hot-joins, and controller-role requests originate from target devices on the bus, and I3C supports hot-joining devices. An attacker controlling an I3C peripheral on the board's chip-to-chip bus can generate high-frequency interrupts timed to collide wit…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-14367"/>
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