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  <updated>2026-10-10T12:39:15.953644+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107215</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-107215</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T12:39:15.956883+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. From 2.3.1 to 2.11.0, extractPart allocates a byte slice directly from an attacker-controlled CFB directory-entry size before validating the sector chain or size domain. extractPart trusts the CFB directory entry streamSize for EncryptionInfo and EncryptedPackage allocations before validating the stream. When a crafted OLE compound file declares a negative or extremely large EncryptionInfo or EncryptedPackage stream size, the declared size reaches make with a negative length or forces a multi-gigabyte allocation, allowing an attacker to panic or exhaust process memory. No fixed version is available as of this review.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107215"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-x2q3-8cjh-766f</id>
    <title>GHSA-x2q3-8cjh-766f — Excelize: extractPart allocates attacker-controlled, unbounded and negative-sized buffers from CFB directory entries: r…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-10T12:39:15.956970+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`extractPart` allocates directly from the mscfb directory-entry size with no clamping (`crypt.go:198`, same missing bound at `crypt.go:204`):</p>
<p>```go
buf := make([]byte, entry.Size)
```</p>
<p>`entry.Size` is the raw `streamSize` field from the attacker-controlled CFB directory entry (mscfb v1.0.8 `fixFile`, `file.go:109-120`: full uint64 → int64 for major version 4, low uint32 for v3). mscfb only detects short sector chains later, inside `File.Read` (`file.go:485-489` "emergency brake") — i.e. **after** the allocation. The zip path already enforces `UnzipSizeLimit`, and the KDF path bounds work with `maxSpinCount`; this path consults no limit at all.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Two consequences, both execution-confirmed against pristine master (`ecd99d761fe0`, 2026-09-08):</p>
<p>1. **Hard crash**: a version-4 CFB declaring `streamSize = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF` yields `entry.Size == -1` → `panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range`, which escapes `Decrypt` (`openReaderAt` converts errors, not panics, `excelize.go:210-214`) and kills the process.
2. **Memory exhaustion**: any CFB (v3 suffices) declaring `streamSize` up to `0xFFFFFFFF` forces up to 4 GiB of zeroed allocation from a ~12 KB file — an amplification factor of ~350,000×, trivially repeated per request in memory-limited deployments.</p>
<p>Call path: `OpenFile`/`OpenReader`/`OpenBytes` → `openReaderAt` (`excelize.go:208-215`, OLE magic sniff) → `Decrypt` (`crypt.go:145-150`) → `extractPart` (`crypt.go:198`).</p>
<p>### PoC</p>
<p>A standalone…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-x2q3-8cjh-766f"/>
  </entry>
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