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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-30T17:54:51.443891+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102714</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-102714</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T17:54:51.446053+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length &gt; 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.</p>
<p>Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length &lt;&lt; 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.</p>
<p>**Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.</p>
<p>**Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.</p>
<p>**One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.</p>
<p>During a runawa…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102714"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jj75-gvv3-wr54</id>
    <title>GHSA-jj75-gvv3-wr54</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T17:54:51.446209+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>`_nx_icmpv6_validate_options()` scans the option area with `while (length &gt; 2)` (`common/src/nx_icmpv6_validate_options.c:79`). An area whose size leaves a one- or two-byte residue exits the loop with that tail unexamined; the residue is not negative, so the function returns `NX_SUCCESS`. Its zero-length rejection never sees those bytes.</p>
<p>Every consumer then re-walks the same area, reading a two-byte option header at the residue and subtracting `nx_icmpv6_option_length &lt;&lt; 3` with no zero check and no remaining-length check. Three outcomes follow, selected by bytes the attacker controls.</p>
<p>**Zero length byte.** The walker subtracts zero and advances zero. All four handlers loop forever — `_nx_icmpv6_process_ra` (`nx_icmpv6_process_ra.c:245, :528`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_ns` (`:251, :329`), `_nx_icmpv6_process_na` (`:147, :156`) and `_nx_icmpv6_process_redirect` (`:247, :350`). The walk runs in the IP thread, which is the highest-priority thread and does not yield inside the loop, so the system stops until a watchdog reset and the frame can be replayed after each one.</p>
<p>**Non-zero length byte on a short residue.** The three unsigned counters underflow — `2 - 8` becomes `0xFFFFFFFA` — and the walk continues past the packet buffer, reading until it faults or meets a zero length byte and freezes. The Router Advertisement counter is signed and exits cleanly in this case.</p>
<p>**One-byte residue.** The walker reads a two-byte option header, over-reading one byte.</p>
<p>During a runawa…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jj75-gvv3-wr54"/>
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