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  <updated>2026-10-05T11:47:05.404632+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-50274</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-50274 — dd-trace-go: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T11:47:05.429440+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> DataDog dd-trace-go</p>
<p>Datadog dd-trace-go is a Go client library for Datadog application performance monitoring, profiling, and security monitoring. Prior to 2.8.1, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-50274"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-74j5-xf3v-crq8</id>
    <title>GHSA-74j5-xf3v-crq8 — dd-trace-go: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T11:47:05.429521+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go, Go: github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go/v2</p>
<p>### Impact
Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled.
The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.</p>
<p>### Patches
This is resolved in version 2.8.1 and later of the `dd-trace-go` library.</p>
<p>### Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently).
2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`).</p>
<p>### Resources
Related upstrea…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-74j5-xf3v-crq8"/>
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