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  <updated>2026-09-30T20:00:22.477253+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-45339</id>
    <title>CVE-2024-45339 — Vulnerability when creating log files in github.com/golang/glog</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T20:00:22.527712+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> github.com/golang/glog</p>
<p>When logs are written to a widely-writable directory (the default), an unprivileged attacker may predict a privileged process's log file path and pre-create a symbolic link to a sensitive file in its place. When that privileged process runs, it will follow the planted symlink and overwrite that sensitive file. To fix that, glog now causes the program to exit (with status code 2) when it finds that the configured log file already exists.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-45339"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf</id>
    <title>GHSA-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf — chi Middleware Vulnerable to Potential IP Spoofing via `X-Forwarded-For` Header in `Request.RemoteAddr` Resolution</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T20:00:22.527829+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware, Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware, Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware, Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware, Go: github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware</p>
<p>### Summary
The vulnerability allows the `Request.RemoteAddr` to be spoofed when determining the request source IP via the `X-Forwarded-For` header. This could result in misidentification of the request source and potentially compromise access control and logging integrity.</p>
<p>### Details
Currently, the `RealIP()` implementation splits the `X-Forwarded-For` header by `,` and uses the first IP.
https://github.com/go-chi/chi/blob/v5.1.0/middleware/realip.go#L50-L54</p>
<p>However, relying on the first IP in the `X-Forwarded-For` header is insecure because it can be manipulated by attackers to falsify the source IP.</p>
<p>Malicious Case:
1. A malicious client sends a request with a forged IP in the X-Forwarded-For header: `X-Forwarded-For: &lt;forged-ip&gt;`
2. The proxy appends the actual client’s IP and forwards the request: `X-Forwarded-For: &lt;forged-ip&gt;,&lt;client-ip&gt;`
3. If the server always uses the first IP, it becomes vulnerable to IP spoofing.</p>
<p>Ideally, the implementation should verify IPs starting from the end of the `X-Forwarded-For` header value, skipping trusted IPs within the system, and using the first untrusted IP as the actual client IP.</p>
<p>For example, the `labstack/echo` web framework processes the `X-Forwarded-For` header by checking IPs from the end, skipping trusted IPs, and using the first untrusted IP as the client's ip.
https://github.com/labstack/echo/blob/v4.13.2/ip.go#L261-L273</p>
<p>### PoC
#### 1. Run the Go application with the following code:
```go
package main</p>
<p>import (…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9g5q-2w5x-hmxf"/>
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