<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T19:24:14.099196+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33637</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-33637 — Faraday: Protocol-relative URI objects still bypass host scoping (possible incomplete fix for GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T19:24:14.208076+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> lostisland faraday</p>
<p>Faraday is an HTTP client library abstraction layer that provides a common interface over many adapters. Versions 2.0.0 through 2.14.1 still allow protocol-relative host override when the request target is passed as a URI object (rather than a String) to Faraday::Connection#build_exclusive_url. This bypasses the February 2026 fix for GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2 and enables off-host request forgery: a request built from a fixed-base Faraday::Connection can be redirected to an attacker-controlled host, forwarding connection-scoped values such as Authorization headers and default query parameters. This issue has been fixed in version 2.14.3.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-33637"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5rv5-xj5j-3484</id>
    <title>GHSA-5rv5-xj5j-3484 — Faraday has a possible incomplete fix for GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2: protocol-relative URI objects still bypass host scoping</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T19:24:14.208180+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> RubyGems: faraday</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`Faraday::Connection#build_exclusive_url` still allows protocol-relative host override when the request target is provided as a `URI` object instead of a `String`. This bypasses the February 2026 fix for `GHSA-33mh-2634-fwr2` and can redirect a request built from a fixed-base `Faraday::Connection` to an attacker-controlled host while preserving connection-scoped headers such as `Authorization`.</p>
<p>## Affected Component</p>
<p>- **Repository File(s)/Endpoint(s)**:
  - `lib/faraday/connection.rb`
  - `lib/faraday/request.rb`
  - `spec/faraday/connection_spec.rb`
  - `spec/faraday/request_spec.rb`
- **Function(s)**:
  - `Faraday::Connection#build_exclusive_url`
  - `Faraday::Connection#run_request`
  - `Faraday::Request#url`
  - `Faraday::Request#to_env`
- **Version(s) Tested**:
  - `Faraday 2.14.1`
  - repository HEAD `a01039c948d3e9e41e03d152aed7244f0fb4d5ca`</p>
<p>## Attacker Profile</p>
<p>- **Who**: A remote user who can influence a per-request target/path in an application that uses a fixed-base Faraday connection
- **Access Required**: Ability to supply data that the application converts to `URI.parse(...)` and passes to `conn.get(...)`, `[conn.post](http://conn.post/)(...)`, or `req.url(...)`
- **Capability**: Control over a protocol-relative URI such as `URI("//evil.example/pwn")`</p>
<p>## Steps to Reproduce</p>
<p>1. Use the current repository checkout and load Faraday from `lib/`.
2. Build a fixed-base connection and provide a protocol-relative `URI` object to `req.url`.
3. Observe th…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5rv5-xj5j-3484"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
