Affected: netty

Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.

Affected: Maven: org.apache.logging.log4j:log4j-core

Apache Log4j Core's [`XmlLayout`](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/layouts.html#XmlLayout), in versions up to and including 2.25.3, fails to sanitize characters forbidden by the [XML 1.0 specification](https://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#charsets), producing invalid XML output whenever a log message or MDC value contains such characters.

The impact depends on the StAX implementation in use:

* **JRE built-in StAX**: Forbidden characters are silently written to the output, producing malformed XML. Conforming parsers must reject such documents with a fatal error, which may cause downstream log-processing systems to drop the affected records. * **Alternative StAX implementations** (e.g., [Woodstox](https://github.com/FasterXML/woodstox), a transitive dependency of the Jackson XML Dataformat module): An exception is thrown during the logging call, and the log event is never delivered to its intended appender, only to Log4j's internal status logger.

Users are advised to upgrade to Apache Log4j Core 2.25.4, which corrects this issue by sanitizing forbidden characters before XML output.