Affected: npm: nodemailer

### Summary When a custom `envelope` object is passed to `sendMail()` with a `size` property containing CRLF characters (`\r\n`), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including `RCPT TO` — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.

### Details In `lib/smtp-connection/index.js` (lines 1161-1162), the `envelope.size` value is concatenated into the SMTP `MAIL FROM` command without any CRLF sanitization:

```javascript if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) { args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size); } ```

This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized: - **Addresses** (`from`, `to`): validated for `[\r\n<>]` at lines 1107-1127 - **DSN parameters** (`dsn.ret`, `dsn.envid`, `dsn.orcpt`): encoded via `encodeXText()` at lines 1167-1183

The `size` property reaches this code path through `MimeNode.setEnvelope()` in `lib/mime-node/index.js` (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:

```javascript const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from']; Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => { if (!standardFields.includes(key)) { this._envelope[key] = envelope[key]; } }); ```

Since `_sendCommand()` writes the command string followed by `\r\n` to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the `size` value terminates the `MAIL FROM` command and…