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  <updated>2026-10-07T10:24:09.448754+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-61726</id>
    <title>CVE-2025-61726 — Memory exhaustion in query parameter parsing in net/url</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T10:24:09.548146+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go standard library net/url, Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.3.1, Red Hat HawtIO HawtIO 4.4.0, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.4 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 10, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 and 152 more</p>
<p>The net/url package does not set a limit on the number of query parameters in a query. While the maximum size of query parameters in URLs is generally limited by the maximum request header size, the net/http.Request.ParseForm method can parse large URL-encoded forms. Parsing a large form containing many unique query parameters can cause excessive memory consumption.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-61726"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pc3f-x583-g7j2</id>
    <title>GHSA-pc3f-x583-g7j2 — SpdyStream: DOS on CRI</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T10:24:09.550117+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/moby/spdystream</p>
<p>The SPDY/3 frame parser in spdystream does not validate
attacker-controlled counts and lengths before allocating memory. A
remote peer that can send SPDY frames to a service using spdystream can
cause the process to allocate gigabytes of memory with a small number of
malformed control frames, leading to an out-of-memory crash.
 
Three allocation paths in the receive side are affected:
1. **SETTINGS entry count** -- The SETTINGS frame reader reads a 32-bit
`numSettings` from the payload and allocates a slice of that size
without checking it against the declared frame length. An attacker
can set `numSettings` to a value far exceeding the actual payload,
triggering a large allocation before any setting data is read.
 
2. **Header count** -- `parseHeaderValueBlock` reads a 32-bit
`numHeaders` from the decompressed header block and allocates an
`http.Header` map of that size with no upper bound.
 
3. **Header field size** -- Individual header name and value lengths are
read as 32-bit integers and used directly as allocation sizes with
no validation.
 
Because SPDY header blocks are zlib-compressed, a small on-the-wire
payload can decompress into attacker-controlled bytes that the parser
interprets as 32-bit counts and lengths. A single crafted frame is
enough to exhaust process memory.
## Impact
 Any program that accepts SPDY connections using spdystream -- directly
or through a dependent library -- is affected. A remote peer that can
send SPDY frames to the service can crash the…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-pc3f-x583-g7j2"/>
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