Affected: npm: defu

### Impact

Applications that pass unsanitized user input (e.g. parsed JSON request bodies, database records, or config files from untrusted sources) as the first argument to `defu()` are vulnerable to prototype pollution.

A crafted payload containing a `__proto__` key can override intended default values in the merged result:

```js import { defu } from 'defu'

const userInput = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}') const config = defu(userInput, { isAdmin: false })

config.isAdmin // true — attacker overrides the server default ```

### Root Cause

The internal `_defu` function used `Object.assign({}, defaults)` to copy the defaults object. `Object.assign` invokes the `__proto__` setter, which replaces the resulting object's `[[Prototype]]` with attacker-controlled values. Properties inherited from the polluted prototype then bypass the existing `__proto__` key guard in the `for...in` loop and land in the final result.

### Fix

Replace `Object.assign({}, defaults)` with object spread (`{ ...defaults }`), which uses `[[DefineOwnProperty]]` and does not invoke the `__proto__` setter.

### Affected Versions

<= 6.1.4

### Credits

Reported by [@BlackHatExploitation](https://github.com/BlackHatExploitation)