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  <updated>2026-10-01T13:03:25.353666+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh</id>
    <title>GHSA-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh — Eclipse Jetty: HTTP Authority/Host mismatch</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T13:03:25.372152+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server</p>
<p>#### Summary</p>
<p>Jetty currently accepts HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests where the regular
Host header and the pseudo-header :authority
do not match. As a result, the same request can carry two different host identities
through Jetty:</p>
<p>- logic based on `HttpURI` / `Request.getServerName(request)` uses `:authority`
- logic based on raw request headers continues to use `Host`</p>
<p>This creates a host/authority confusion condition that can break
security assumptions in higher layers.</p>
<p>Jetty already performs an explicit authority/Host consistency check on
the HTTP/1.1 path, but equivalent validation is missing on the HTTP/2
and HTTP/3 paths.</p>
<p>#### Security Impact</p>
<p>This issue is not inherently remote code execution, but it can become
security-relevant in deployments that rely on the request host for
security-sensitive decisions, including:</p>
<p>- host-based access control
- virtual host isolation
- multi-tenant routing by hostname
- login/logout/callback URL construction
- reverse proxy and forwarded-header trust chains
- auditing, cache keys, and absolute URL generation</p>
<p>Potential consequences include:</p>
<p>- bypass of host-based ACLs
- virtual host or tenant isolation failures
- incorrect or attacker-influenced redirect/callback targets
- inconsistent proxy/downstream interpretation of the original target host
- misleading logs and audit records</p>
<p>#### Technical Root Cause</p>
<p>1. On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 metadata builder paths:</p>
<p>- `:authority` is parsed separately into authority/URI state
- `Host` is…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-7p3p-8qv8-m2vh"/>
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