https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-09-29T02:30:59.263104+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-2303 CVE-2026-2303 — Heap Out-of-Bounds Read in Go Driver GSSAPI C Wrappers enables application crash or information leak 2026-09-29T02:30:59.392181+00:00

Affected: MongoDB Inc MongoDB Go Driver

The mongo-go-driver repository contains CGo bindings for GSSAPI (Kerberos) authentication on Linux and macOS. The C wrapper implementation contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability due to incorrect assumptions about string termination in the GSSAPI standard. Since GSSAPI buffers are not guaranteed to be null-terminated or have extra padding, this results in reading one byte past the allocated heap buffer.

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-hrxh-6v49-42gf GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf — gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities 2026-09-29T02:30:59.392344+00:00

Affected: Go: google.golang.org/grpc

Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:

- Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing `Metadata` or `RequestedServerName` fields. - Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets. - Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing `NOT` rules around unsupported fields.

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_

#### xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via `Metadata` & `RequestedServerName` matchers

- Affected Component: xDS RBAC - Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported `permission` and `principal` rules (specifically `Metadata` and `RequestedServerName`) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops. - If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions. - If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical `NOT` rules (`Permission_NotRule` / `Principal_NotId`) or multi-condition `OR/AND` rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.

As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized…