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  <updated>2026-10-04T01:54:17.671381+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-w7j5-j98m-w679</id>
    <title>GHSA-w7j5-j98m-w679 — OpenClaw has multiple E2E/test Dockerfiles that run all processes as root</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T01:54:17.733515+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p>
<p>Three Dockerfiles in scripts/docker/ and scripts/e2e/ lack a USER directive, meaning all processes run as uid 0 (root). If any process is compromised, the attacker has root inside the container, making container breakout significantly easier.
**Partial fix (2026-02-08):** Commit 28e1a65e added USER sandbox to Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser. The E2E/test Dockerfiles listed below remain unpatched.</p>
<p>**Affected components:**
- scripts/e2e/Dockerfile
- scripts/e2e/Dockerfile.qr-import
- scripts/docker/install-sh-e2e/Dockerfile
- scripts/docker/install-sh-nonroot/Dockerfile (runs as app but with NOPASSWD sudo — see related advisory)</p>
<p>**Technical Reproduction:**
1. Open each Dockerfile listed above and search for a USER directive — none found.
2. Run any of these containers: docker run --rm -it &lt;image&gt; id
3. Observe: returns uid=0(root).</p>
<p>**Demonstrated Impact:**
- Root inside the container enables kernel exploit attempts, volume mount abuse, and privileged syscall access.
- Test images share the same base (node:22-bookworm) as production, creating risk of accidental deployment of root-running images.</p>
<p>**Environment:** Base images node:22-bookworm and node:22-bookworm-slim default to root. Dockerfile.sandbox and Dockerfile.sandbox-browser were remediated in commit 28e1a65e; only the E2E/test images listed above remain affected.</p>
<p>**Remediation:** Add a USER directive before CMD/ENTRYPOINT in each remaining Dockerfile:
  RUN useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash…</p></div>
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