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  <updated>2026-09-28T18:17:55.798436+00:00</updated>
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    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45004</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-45004 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.4.23 - Arbitrary Code Execution via setup-api.js in Current Working Directory</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T18:17:57.198809+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p>
<p>OpenClaw before 2026.4.23 contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability in the bundled plugin setup resolver that loads setup-api.js from process.cwd() during provider setup metadata resolution. Attackers can execute arbitrary JavaScript under the current user account by placing a malicious extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js file in a repository and convincing a user to run OpenClaw commands from that directory.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45004"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r39h-4c2p-3jxp</id>
    <title>GHSA-r39h-4c2p-3jxp — OpenClaw vulnerable to arbitrary code execution via attacker-controlled setup-api.js loaded from cwd during env-key res…</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T18:17:57.198906+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>OpenClaw's bundled plugin setup resolver could fall back to `process.cwd()` while resolving provider setup metadata. If a user ran an OpenClaw command from an attacker-controlled repository containing `extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js`, OpenClaw could load and execute that JavaScript during ordinary provider/model status resolution.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>This is arbitrary JavaScript execution in the OpenClaw process under the current user account. A malicious repository could run code when the user executed commands such as provider/model inspection from that directory. The issue does not require gateway network exposure, but it does require user interaction: the user must run OpenClaw from a directory containing the attacker-controlled setup file.</p>
<p>## Affected Packages / Versions</p>
<p>- Package: `openclaw` on npm
- Affected: versions before `2026.4.23`
- Fixed: `2026.4.23`
- Latest stable verified fixed: `openclaw@2026.4.23`, tag `v2026.4.23`</p>
<p>## Fix</p>
<p>OpenClaw now resolves bundled setup fallbacks only from the canonical package/repository root and no longer includes `process.cwd()` as a trusted setup-api search root. A regression test verifies that a workspace-local `extensions/&lt;plugin&gt;/setup-api.js` is not loaded through provider setup resolution.</p>
<p>## Fix Commit(s)</p>
<p>- `993781e6e6eaf50f033cfc3e3bf4f47059740707` (`fix(plugins): ignore cwd setup-api fallback`)</p>
<p>## Severity</p>
<p>Severity remains `high` because successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution under the user ru…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-r39h-4c2p-3jxp"/>
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