Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.14 contain an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the exec-approvals allowlist validation that checks pre-expansion argv tokens but executes using real shell expansion. Attackers with authorization or through prompt-injection attacks can exploit safe binaries like head, tail, or grep with glob patterns or environment variables to disclose files readable by the gateway or node process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.

Affected: npm: openclaw

## Summary

OpenClaw's exec-approvals allowlist supports a small set of "safe bins" intended to be stdin-only (no positional file arguments) when running `tools.exec.host=gateway|node` with `security=allowlist`.

In affected configurations, the allowlist validation checked pre-expansion argv tokens, but execution used a real shell (`sh -c`) which expands globs and environment variables. This allowed safe bins like `head`, `tail`, or `grep` to read arbitrary local files via tokens such as `*` or `$HOME/...` without triggering approvals.

This issue is configuration-dependent and is not exercised by default settings (default `tools.exec.host` is `sandbox`).

## Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.2.13` - Patched: `>= 2026.2.14` (planned; publish the advisory after the npm release is out)

## Impact

An authorized but untrusted caller (or prompt-injection) could cause the gateway/node process to disclose files readable by that process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.

## Fix

Safe-bins executions now force argv tokens to be treated as literal text at execution time (single-quoted), preventing globbing and `$VARS` expansion from turning "safe" tokens into file paths.

## Fix Commit(s)

- 77b89719d5b7e271f48b6f49e334a8b991468c3b

## Release Process Note

`patched_versions` is pre-set for the next planned release (`>= 2026.2.14`) so publishing is a single click once that npm version is available.

Thanks @christos-eth for…