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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-28T07:46:01.427276+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48045</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-48045 — Zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:46:01.476315+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-zeroconf</p>
<p>Zeroconf is a pure Python implementation of multicast DNS service discovery. Prior to 0.149.12, AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer retained every truncated TC-bit incoming query, each up to _MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966 bytes, in self._deferred[addr] and armed a per-address timer in self._timers[addr] without capping the per-address list or distinct addr keys, allowing unauthenticated hosts on the local link over UDP/5353 (224.0.0.251 / ff02::fb) to spoof sources, grow _deferred and _timers, and cause memory exhaustion and quadratic CPU burn. This issue is fixed in version 0.149.12.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-48045"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9663-mqmp-p9mm</id>
    <title>GHSA-9663-mqmp-p9mm — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:46:01.476445+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.</p>
<p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `&gt;= 0.149.12`.</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-9663-mqmp-p9mm"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3435</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3435 — python-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T07:46:01.476538+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zeroconf</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>`AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival.</p>
<p>Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks).</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `&gt;= 0.149.12`.</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, g…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3435"/>
  </entry>
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