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  <updated>2026-09-30T22:47:18.415827+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53345</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53345 — KVM: Don't WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T22:47:18.432470+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>KVM: Don't WARN if memory is dirtied without a vCPU when the VM is dying</p>
<p>When marking a page dirty, complain about not having a running/loaded vCPU
if and only if the VM is still alive, i.e. its refcount is non-zero.  This
will allow fixing a memory leak for x86 SEV-ES guests without hitting what
is effectively a false positive on the WARN.</p>
<p>For some SEV-ES VM-Exits, KVM keeps a writable mapping of a guest page
across an exit to userspace, and typically unmaps the page on the next
KVM_RUN.  But if userspace never calls KVM_RUN after such an exit, then KVM
needs to unmap the page when the vCPU is destroyed, which in turn triggers
the WARN about not having a running vCPU.</p>
<p>Alternatively, SEV-ES could temporarily load the vCPU to suppress the WARN,
as is done in nested_vmx_free_vcpu() (but for completely unrelated reasons;
suppressing WARN from nested_put_vmcs12_pages() is pure happenstance).  But
loading a vCPU during destruction is gross (ideally nVMX code would be
cleaned up), risks complicating the SEV-ES code (KVM would need to ensure
the temporarily load()+put() only runs when the vCPU isn't already loaded),
and is ultimately pointless.</p>
<p>The motivation for the WARN is to guard against KVM dirtying guest memory
without pushing the corresponding GFN to the active vCPU's dirty ring, e.g.
to ensure userspace doesn't miss a dirty page.  But for the VM's refcount
to reach zero, there can't be _any_ userspace…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53345"/>
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