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  <updated>2026-09-29T23:50:48.044035+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53136</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53136 — drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T23:50:48.046172+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Linux</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size</p>
<p>[Why &amp; How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.</p>
<p>Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().</p>
<p>(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-53136"/>
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