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CVE-2026-54350 — Budibase: Anonymous NoSQL operator injection via published-app query templates

2026-10-04T07:35:58.382013+00:00

Affected: budibase

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.12, an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-PartiQL, or REST-with-JSON-body collection and, where the builder has published a PUBLIC write query, modifies every document of that collection with one HTTP request. enrichContext at packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138 substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then JSON.parses the result. The validator validateQueryInputs at packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71 rejects only Handlebars markers ({{, }}) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (", \, }). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object. For Mongo find, the parsed filter passes directly to collection.find() (packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's {name: "..."} with {name: {$exists: true}} and returns every document. The same primitive against an updateMany query (mongodb.ts:577-585) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled $set body runs against every matched document. The authorized middleware at packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148 short-circuits when the query's role is PUBLIC. CSRF is not enforced on this path. POST /api/v2/queries/:query…

GHSA-8qv3-p479-cj62 — Budibase has nonymous NoSQL operator injection via published-app query templates

2026-10-04T07:35:58.382241+00:00

Affected: npm: @budibase/server

## Summary

`enrichContext` at `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/queries/queries.ts:121-138` substitutes parameter values into the raw JSON body of a query, then `JSON.parse`s the result. The validator `validateQueryInputs` at `packages/server/src/api/controllers/query/index.ts:61-71` rejects only Handlebars markers (`{{`, `}}`) in user input and does not escape JSON metacharacters (`"`, `\`, `}`). A parameter value containing a closing quote and additional keys lifts attacker-controlled fields into the parsed filter object.

For Mongo `find`, the parsed filter passes directly to `collection.find()` (`packages/server/src/integrations/mongodb.ts:506-510`). Duplicate-key JSON parsing overrides the builder's `{name: "..."}` with `{name: {$exists: true}}` and returns every document. The same primitive against an `updateMany` query (`mongodb.ts:577-585`) widens the filter scope to the full collection while the builder-controlled `$set` body runs against every matched document.

The `authorized` middleware at `packages/server/src/middleware/authorized.ts:141-148` short-circuits when the query's role is `PUBLIC`. CSRF is not enforced on this path. `POST /api/v2/queries/:queryId` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/query.ts:63`) accepts the call with no session, only an `x-budibase-app-id` header that is public from the published-app URL.

Result: an unauthenticated visitor of any published Budibase app reads every document of the backing MongoDB, CouchDB, Elasticsearch, DynamoDB-Part…