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  <updated>2026-09-29T06:32:40.947928+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-59200</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-59200 — Pillow: Decompression Bomb DoS via PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T06:32:40.963047+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> python-pillow Pillow</p>
<p>Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.1.0 until 12.3.0, PdfParser.PdfStream.decode() in PIL/PdfParser.py calls zlib.decompress() with bufsize set to the PDF stream Length field without bounding the decompressed output size, allowing a crafted FlateDecode PDF stream to exhaust memory from a small file. This issue is fixed in version 12.3.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-59200"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jjj6-mw9f-p565</id>
    <title>GHSA-jjj6-mw9f-p565 — Pillow: Decompression Bomb DoS via PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T06:32:40.963121+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: Pillow</p>
<p>### Summary
`PdfParser.PdfStream.decode()` in Pillow's `PdfParser.py` calls `zlib.decompress()` with the `bufsize` parameter set to the value of the PDF stream's `Length` field, without any upper bound on the actual decompressed output size. Python's `zlib.decompress()` `bufsize` argument is an *initial output buffer hint*, not a maximum size limit — the function will expand memory until the full decompressed result is produced. A crafted PDF containing a FlateDecode-compressed stream decompresses to 1 GB of memory from a ~950 KB file, causing server OOM termination or severe degradation in any application that uses `PdfParser` to read untrusted PDF files.</p>
<p>### Details
`PdfStream.decode()` in `pdfminer/PdfParser.py` reads the stream's declared `Length` (or `DL`) field from the PDF dictionary and passes it as `bufsize` to `zlib.decompress()`:</p>
<p>```python
# PIL/PdfParser.py — PdfStream.decode()
class PdfStream:
    def decode(self) -&gt; bytes:
        try:
            filter = self.dictionary[b"Filter"]
        except KeyError:
            return self.buf
        if filter == b"FlateDecode":
            try:
                expected_length = self.dictionary[b"DL"]
            except KeyError:
                expected_length = self.dictionary[b"Length"]
            return zlib.decompress(self.buf, bufsize=int(expected_length))
            #                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
            #  bufsize is an *initial buffer hint*, NOT a maximum size limit.…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jjj6-mw9f-p565"/>
  </entry>
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