https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-02T01:16:20.689393+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-41567 CVE-2026-41567 — Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host 2026-10-02T01:16:20.752673+00:00

Affected: moby/v2/daemon, moby Docker Engine, docker/daemon, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5, Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.6.5, Red Hat OpenShift Developer Tools and Services 1.6.3, Red Hat multicluster global hub 1.5.3, Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.22, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes and 12 more

Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images

 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-x86f-5xw2-fm2r GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r — Docker: `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` executes container binary on the host 2026-10-02T01:16:20.752951+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/moby/moby/v2, Go: github.com/docker/docker, Go: github.com/moby/moby

## Summary

When a user uploads a compressed archive into a container, a malicious image can execute arbitrary code with daemon (host root) privileges.

## Details

When handling `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` requests with compressed archives, the daemon decompresses them using external system binaries. Due to incorrect ordering of operations, these binaries are resolved from the container's filesystem rather than the host's. A container image that includes a trojanized decompression binary can achieve code execution as the daemon process whenever a compressed archive is uploaded to that container.

The executed binary runs with the daemon's full privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities.

## Impact

Arbitrary code execution as host root, crossing the container-to-host trust boundary.

### Conditions for exploitation

- A user must run a container from a malicious image that contains a trojanized decompression binary. - The user must then upload a compressed archive (xz or gzip) into that container, either by piping a compressed archive via `docker cp -` or by calling the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API directly with compressed content.

### Not affected

Standard `docker cp` usage is **not** affected, because the CLI sends uncompressed tar by default:

``` docker cp ./file.txt mycontainer:/file.txt ```

This can only be exploited when explicitly passing a xz or gzip-compressed archive to `docker cp` or the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` API, for…