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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-30T12:59:24.320586+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45321</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-45321 — Malware in 42 @tanstack/* packages exfiltrates cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T12:59:24.324126+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> @tanstack arktype-adapter, @tanstack eslint-plugin-router, @tanstack eslint-plugin-start, @tanstack history, @tanstack nitro-v2-vite-plugin, @tanstack react-router, @tanstack react-router-devtools, @tanstack react-router-ssr-query, @tanstack react-start, @tanstack react-start-client and 32 more</p>
<p>On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-45321"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx</id>
    <title>GHSA-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx — Malware in @tanstack/* packages exfiltrates cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T12:59:24.324321+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @tanstack/arktype-adapter, npm: @tanstack/eslint-plugin-router, npm: @tanstack/eslint-plugin-start, npm: @tanstack/history, npm: @tanstack/nitro-v2-vite-plugin, npm: @tanstack/react-router, npm: @tanstack/react-router-devtools, npm: @tanstack/react-router-ssr-query, npm: @tanstack/react-start, npm: @tanstack/react-start-client and 32 more</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 `@tanstack/*` packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for `TanStack/router`, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a `pull_request_target` "Pwn Request" misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity.</p>
<p>Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>A user installing any affected version executes a payload (~2.3 MB obfuscated `router_init.js`) at install time that:</p>
<p>- Harvests credentials from common locations:
  - AWS instance metadata (IMDS) and Secrets Manager
  - GCP metadata service
  - Kubernetes service-account tokens
  - HashiCorp Vault tokens
  - `~/.npmrc` (npm tokens)
  - GitHub tokens (env vars, `gh` CLI config, `.git-credentials`)
  - SSH private keys (`~/.ssh/`)
- Exfiltrates harvested data over the Session/Oxen messenger file-upload network (`filev2.getsession.org`, `seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org`). This is end-to-end encrypted with no attacker-controlled C2, so blocking by IP or domain is the only network mitigation.
- Enumerates packages that the victim…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-g7cv-rxg3-hmpx"/>
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