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  <updated>2026-10-03T23:09:31.079150+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-27977</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-27977 — Next.js: null origin can bypass dev HMR websocket CSRF checks</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T23:09:31.115757+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> vercel next.js</p>
<p>Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. Starting in version 16.0.1 and prior to version 16.1.7, in `next dev`, cross-site protection for internal websocket endpoints could treat `Origin: null` as a bypass case even if `allowedDevOrigins` is configured, allowing privacy-sensitive/opaque contexts (for example sandboxed documents) to connect unexpectedly. If a dev server is reachable from attacker-controlled content, an attacker may be able to connect to the HMR websocket channel and interact with dev websocket traffic. This affects development mode only. Apps without a configured `allowedDevOrigins` still allow connections from any origin. The issue is fixed in version 16.1.7 by validating `Origin: null` through the same cross-site origin-allowance checks used for other origins. If upgrading is not immediately possible, do not expose `next dev` to untrusted networks and/or block websocket upgrades to `/_next/webpack-hmr` when `Origin` is `null` at the proxy.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-27977"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jcc7-9wpm-mj36</id>
    <title>GHSA-jcc7-9wpm-mj36 — Next.js: null origin can bypass dev HMR websocket CSRF checks</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T23:09:31.115914+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: next</p>
<p>## Summary
In `next dev`, cross-site protections for internal development endpoints could treat `Origin: null` as a bypass case even when [`allowedDevOrigins`](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/config/next-config-js/allowedDevOrigins) is configured. This could allow privacy-sensitive or opaque browser contexts, such as sandboxed documents, to access privileged internal dev-server functionality unexpectedly.</p>
<p>## Impact
If a developer visits attacker-controlled content while running an affected `next dev` server with [`allowedDevOrigins`](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/config/next-config-js/allowedDevOrigins) configured, attacker-controlled browser code may be able to connect to internal development endpoints and interact with sensitive dev-server functionality that should have remained blocked.</p>
<p>This issue affects development mode only. It does not affect `next start`, and it does not expose internal debugging functionality to the network by default.</p>
<p>## Patches
Fixed by validating `Origin: null` through the same cross-site origin-allowance checks used for other origins on internal development endpoints.</p>
<p>## Workarounds
If upgrade is not immediately possible:
- Do not expose `next dev` to untrusted networks.
- If you use [`allowedDevOrigins`](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/config/next-config-js/allowedDevOrigins), reject requests and websocket upgrades with `Origin: null` for internal dev endpoints at your proxy.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-jcc7-9wpm-mj36"/>
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