Affected: Homebrew: openclaw-cli

### Summary `system.run` approvals in OpenClaw used rendered command text as the approval identity while trimming argv token whitespace. Runtime execution still used raw argv. A crafted trailing-space executable token could therefore execute a different binary than what the approver saw.

### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.24` - Patched versions: `>= 2026.2.25`

### Impact This is an approval-integrity bypass that can lead to unexpected command execution under the OpenClaw runtime user when an attacker can influence `command` argv and reuse/obtain a matching approval context.

### Trust Model Note OpenClaw does not treat adversarial multi-user sharing of one gateway host/config as a supported security boundary. This finding is still valid in supported deployments because it breaks the operator approval boundary itself (approved display command vs executed argv).

### Fix Commit(s) - `03e689fc89bbecbcd02876a95957ef1ad9caa176`

### Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.25 contain an approval-integrity bypass vulnerability in system.run where rendered command text is used as approval identity while trimming argv token whitespace, but runtime execution uses raw argv. An attacker can craft a trailing-space executable token to execute a different binary than what the approver displayed, allowing unexpected command execution under the OpenClaw runtime user when they can influence command argv and reuse an approval context.