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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T22:34:18.747544+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-92521</id>
    <title>BELL-CVE-2026-92521</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:34:18.771449+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-92521"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92521</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-92521</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:34:18.771546+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root</p>
<p>acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device-&gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()'d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.</p>
<p>When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device-&gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.</p>
<p>acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without
clearing device-&gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after
the root bridge is removed.</p>
<p>Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in
acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it
in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable
through driver_data after being freed.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-92521"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f</id>
    <title>GHSA-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:34:18.771627+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root</p>
<p>acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to
device-&gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().
Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()'d, but
only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.</p>
<p>When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while
device-&gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear
driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may
dereference this dangling pointer.</p>
<p>acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without
clearing device-&gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after
the root bridge is removed.</p>
<p>Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in
acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it
in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable
through driver_data after being freed.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</id>
    <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11893-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:34:18.771676+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-92521</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-92521</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T22:34:18.771877+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 246 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to device-&gt;driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root(). Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()'d, but only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first. When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while device-&gt;driver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may dereference this dangling pointer. acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without clearing device-&gt;driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after the root bridge is removed. Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable through driver_data after being freed.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-92521"/>
  </entry>
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