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  <updated>2026-10-01T06:01:15.337727+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-91130</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-91130</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T06:01:15.876651+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.7.0, the Statistics Graph card in src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts passed entity names through getStatisticLabel and computeStateName and interpolated param.seriesName into ECharts tooltip HTML without escaping. An authenticated user or an integration that supplies a malicious default entity name could cause script-related HTML to execute when a viewer hovered over a data point. Mean, State, Sum, and Change fields in the default Line chart configuration were affected, while Bar charts were not. This issue is fixed in version 2026.7.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-91130"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wx4m-69m9-gx3m</id>
    <title>GHSA-wx4m-69m9-gx3m — Home Assistant: XSS in Statistics Graph Card</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T06:01:15.876829+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: homeassistant</p>
<p>### Summary
An authenticated party can add a malicious name to any statistics-capable entity, allowing for
Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who views a Statistics Graph card containing that
entity, when they hover over any data point on the chart.</p>
<p>**Payload**
&lt;img width="1529" height="441" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6926ce53-75fb-455a-bd4e-0c5281e8bed8" /&gt;</p>
<p>**Payload triggering**
&lt;img width="835" height="469" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bb9d17a-c123-4d44-8471-35097f65ddd2" /&gt;</p>
<p>An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the
provider of the integration (e.g. Tibber, Shelly, or any HACS integration), and is exploited
that way through the default name — without requiring any direct access to the Home Assistant
instance. This is the same supply-chain vector as CVE-2025-62172.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The Statistics Graph card renders entity names in ECharts tooltips as raw HTML. The offending
line is in `src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts`:</p>
<p>https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts#L236</p>
<p>Where **_`param.seriesName`_** is interpolated verbatim into the returned HTML string:</p>
<p>```
return `${time}${param.marker} ${param.seriesName}: ${value}`;
```</p>
<p>No call to `filterXSS()` is made — unlike the Energy dashboard chart, which was patched as part
of CVE-2025-62172:</p>
<p>```
// FIXED i…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wx4m-69m9-gx3m"/>
  </entry>
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