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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-29T21:12:46.589889+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90398</id>
    <title>BELL-CVE-2026-90398</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:12:47.744709+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bell-cve-2026-90398"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90398</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-90398</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:12:47.744804+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()</p>
<p>Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the
mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to
min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent
memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C
pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short
TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the
allocation.</p>
<p>The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the
buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match
that stride.</p>
<p>Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the
pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably
consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.</p>
<p>Compile tested only.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-90398"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vrcf-5rpv-m35r</id>
    <title>GHSA-vrcf-5rpv-m35r</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:12:47.744875+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()</p>
<p>Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the
mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to
min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent
memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C
pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short
TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the
allocation.</p>
<p>The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the
buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match
that stride.</p>
<p>Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the
pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably
consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.</p>
<p>Compile tested only.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-vrcf-5rpv-m35r"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1</id>
    <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:11893-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:12:47.744920+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>kernel-devel-7.2.8-1.1 on GA media</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:11893-1"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90398</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-90398</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T21:12:47.745095+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 193 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse() Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation. The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride. Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides. Compile tested only.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-90398"/>
  </entry>
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