<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-30T17:00:00.915366+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82642</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-82642</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T17:00:00.917415+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Readest is an open-source e-book reader built on Tauri. In versions prior to 0.11.16, EPUB chapter HTML is sanitized with DOMPurify using a configuration that forbade only the &lt;script&gt; tag (FORBID_TAGS: ['script']) in apps/readest-app/src/services/transformers/sanitizer.ts. DOMPurify does not parse the contents of the srcdoc attribute on &lt;iframe&gt; elements, treating it as an opaque string attribute, so an attacker who can get an &lt;iframe&gt; element to survive sanitization can embed a complete HTML document containing a &lt;script&gt; tag inside srcdoc and have it execute when the browser renders the iframe. The content iframe is configured with sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts", so script executing inside it shares the parent origin and can reach parent.parent.__TAURI_INTERNALS__.invoke(...), giving access to every Tauri IPC command the application is permitted to use, which escalates to arbitrary code execution. The payload can be made invisible (zero-size, transparent iframe) so the reader sees only normal book text. Version 0.11.16 hardened the sanitizer configuration by adding 'iframe', 'object' and 'embed' to FORBID_TAGS and adding 'srcdoc' to FORBID_ATTR.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82642"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wvmc-79x2-m97w</id>
    <title>GHSA-wvmc-79x2-m97w</title>
    <updated>2026-09-30T17:00:00.917540+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Readest is an open-source e-book reader built on Tauri. In versions prior to 0.11.16, EPUB chapter HTML is sanitized with DOMPurify using a configuration that forbade only the &lt;script&gt; tag (FORBID_TAGS: ['script']) in apps/readest-app/src/services/transformers/sanitizer.ts. DOMPurify does not parse the contents of the srcdoc attribute on &lt;iframe&gt; elements, treating it as an opaque string attribute, so an attacker who can get an &lt;iframe&gt; element to survive sanitization can embed a complete HTML document containing a &lt;script&gt; tag inside srcdoc and have it execute when the browser renders the iframe. The content iframe is configured with sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts", so script executing inside it shares the parent origin and can reach parent.parent.__TAURI_INTERNALS__.invoke(...), giving access to every Tauri IPC command the application is permitted to use, which escalates to arbitrary code execution. The payload can be made invisible (zero-size, transparent iframe) so the reader sees only normal book text. Version 0.11.16 hardened the sanitizer configuration by adding 'iframe', 'object' and 'embed' to FORBID_TAGS and adding 'srcdoc' to FORBID_ATTR.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wvmc-79x2-m97w"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
