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  <updated>2026-10-01T10:06:47.090336+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-13683</id>
    <title>bdu:2026-13683</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T10:06:48.083028+00:00</updated>
    <content>bdu:2026-13683</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/bdu:2026-13683"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81891</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-81891</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T10:06:48.083094+00:00</updated>
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        <p>elFinder is an open-source file manager for web, written in JavaScript using jQuery UI. Prior to 2.1.70, checkExtractItems() in php/elFinderVolumeDriver.class.php calls mimetypeInternalDetect() without passing the result through mimeTypeNormalize(). Because the .phtml, .phar, .php5, and .php3 extensions are absent from mime.types, the staticMimeMap entries that map them to text/x-php are not applied, and allowPutMime() permits extraction even when uploadDeny blocks text/x-php. An attacker with ZIP upload permission can extract PHP-executable files into a web-accessible files/ directory and achieve remote code execution when the server executes those extensions. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.70.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81891"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gxmj-r5rf-ggwq</id>
    <title>GHSA-gxmj-r5rf-ggwq — elFinder: ZIP extraction bypasses uploadDeny MIME filter allowing PHP file upload (RCE)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T10:06:48.083163+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: Studio-42/elFinder</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>elFinder provides `uploadDeny` and `uploadAllow` options in its connector configuration to restrict which MIME types may be uploaded. When `uploadDeny` includes `text/x-php`, direct upload of `.php`, `.phtml`, and `.phar` files is correctly blocked. However, the `extract` command (ZIP decompression) internally calls `checkExtractItems()`, which invokes `mimetypeInternalDetect()` directly without passing the result through `mimeTypeNormalize()`. Because `phtml`, `phar`, and similar PHP-executable extensions are absent from `mime.types`, they are not resolved to `text/x-php` at the detection stage, causing the MIME filter to be silently bypassed. An attacker who is permitted to upload ZIP archives can therefore extract PHP-executable files into the web-accessible `files/` directory. If the server is configured to execute the affected extension (e.g., `.phtml`, `.phar`) as PHP — which is the case in common Apache and Nginx deployments — this results in Remote Code Execution.</p>
<p>---</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>elFinder's MIME validation pipeline for **direct uploads** (`upload` command) is:</p>
<p>```
mimetype()
  └─ mimetypeInternalDetect()   // stage 1: extension → MIME via mime.types
  └─ mimeTypeNormalize()        // stage 2: apply staticMimeMap
       phtml:* → text/x-php
       phar:*  → text/x-php
       php5:*  → text/x-php
  └─ allowPutMime()             // blocked: text/x-php ∈ uploadDeny
```</p>
<p>The `extract` command (`checkExtractItems()` in `elFinderVolumeDriver.class.php`, lin…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-gxmj-r5rf-ggwq"/>
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