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  <updated>2026-10-04T11:41:28.210038+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73845</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-73845</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T11:41:28.605082+00:00</updated>
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        <p>CKAN MCP Server is a tool for querying CKAN open data portals. Prior to 0.4.112, the ckan_get_mqa_quality and ckan_get_mqa_quality_details tools in src/tools/quality.ts use isValidMqaServer to validate the server_url parameter with a prefix-only regular expression for dati.gov.it, allowing suffix-host and URL-userinfo values to target an attacker-controlled host and return a spoofed response. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.112.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73845"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-83x6-42hr-jc76</id>
    <title>GHSA-83x6-42hr-jc76 — CKAN MCP Server: MQA server allowlist bypass via unanchored regex (`isValidMqaServer`)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T11:41:28.605376+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @aborruso/ckan-mcp-server</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `ckan_get_mqa_quality` and `ckan_get_mqa_quality_details` tools restrict their `server_url` argument to `dati.gov.it` via a regular expression. The regex is anchored only at the start and places no boundary after the host, so any URL whose host merely **begins with** `dati.gov.it` — or that uses `dati.gov.it` as URL *userinfo* before an `@` — passes validation while actually targeting an attacker-controlled host.</p>
<p>## Affected code</p>
<p>```js
// src/tools/quality.ts
const ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS = [
  /^https?:\/\/(www\.)?dati\.gov\.it/i        // &lt;-- no end anchor / host boundary
];
export function isValidMqaServer(serverUrl: string): boolean {
  return ALLOWED_SERVER_PATTERNS.some(pattern =&gt; pattern.test(serverUrl));
}
```</p>
<p>All of the following return `true`:</p>
<p>| URL | Real host |
|-----|-----------|
| `https://dati.gov.it.attacker.com/x` | `dati.gov.it.attacker.com` (attacker) |
| `http://dati.gov.it.evil.example/api` | `dati.gov.it.evil.example` (attacker) |
| `https://dati.gov.it@attacker.com/x` | `attacker.com` (userinfo trick) |</p>
<p>After passing this check, `server_url` flows into `getMqaQuality`/`getMqaQualityDetails`, which call `makeCkanRequest(serverUrl, "package_show", { id })`. The server therefore issues a request to the attacker-controlled host and returns its (parsed) response to the caller.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- The intended "dati.gov.it only" trust boundary for the MQA tools is defeated; they can be driven against arbitrary external hosts.
- The attacker ho…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-83x6-42hr-jc76"/>
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