msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.

msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.

libmsgpack-c2-7.0.2-2.1 on GA media

Security update for msgpack-c

Affected: Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: msgpack-c, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: msgpack-c, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: msgpack-c, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: msgpack-c, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: msgpack-c

msgpack_unpacker_expand_buffer in src/unpack.c, reached through the public msgpack_unpacker_reserve_buffer API, computes its new buffer size using an unchecked size_t addition of the requested size and the amount already used. The doubling loop guards its own multiplication against overflow, but the addition in the loop condition is unguarded, so a request near SIZE_MAX wraps: the loop condition is already satisfied, the allocation is performed at the small pre-wrap size, and the function returns true. The caller is told the requested capacity was reserved when it was not, so a subsequent write of the requested length overflows the heap buffer. The library's own example/lib_buffer_unpack.c demonstrates the reserve-then-write pattern, and its defensive assert comparing capacity against the request is compiled out under NDEBUG. msgpack-c's own decode entry points do not derive the reservation size from untrusted input, so reaching this requires an integration that passes an attacker-influenced length to the reservation API, such as a length-prefixed streaming transport.