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  <updated>2026-09-28T13:43:43.766007+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65608</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-65608</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T13:43:43.769746+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Grav versions &gt;= 1.7.0 and before 2.0.9 contain a remote code execution vulnerability. FlexDirectory::dynamicDataField() resolves blueprint data-*@: directives by calling call_user_func_array() on attacker-influenced input, validating only that the target is callable (is_callable()) without restricting dangerous functions such as exec, system, passthru, or shell_exec. Because FlexDirectory registers this handler for every Flex directory, it bypasses the validation added to Blueprint::dynamicData() in 2.0.7 (GHSA-fj2p-qj2f-74v5). Any authenticated user with create or update permission on any Flex-based directory (Flex Users, Flex Pages, Flex Objects, or custom Flex types) can execute arbitrary shell commands on the server.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-65608"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c4wf-2xxc-68qm</id>
    <title>GHSA-c4wf-2xxc-68qm — Grav: FlexDirectory::dynamicDataField() executes arbitrary callables from blueprint data with no validation</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T13:43:43.769867+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: getgrav/grav</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>A missing validation check in Grav's Flex framework lets an account holding nothing but an ordinary object-create permission on a single Flex directory execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. Any authenticated user with `create` or `update` rights on a Flex-based directory (Flex Users, Flex Pages, Flex Objects, or any custom Flex type) can trigger it the moment a blueprint field anywhere in that directory carries a `data-*@:` directive, since the code that resolves those directives calls `call_user_func_array()` on attacker-influenced input with no restriction at all.</p>
<p>This is a bypass of GHSA-fj2p-qj2f-74v5, already patched in 2.0.7. That fix added real validation to `Blueprint::dynamicData()`, but Grav's Flex system routes the same directive through a separate, unprotected method, `FlexDirectory::dynamicDataField()`, which never received the same fix.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Grav blueprints support `action-property@:` directives, YAML keys that tell the blueprint engine to compute a field's value dynamically by calling a function. `Blueprint::init()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:167-177`) resolves these by checking for a registered handler first, and only falling back to the built-in `dynamic{Action}` method if none is registered:</p>
<p>```php
foreach ($data as $property =&gt; $call) {
    $action = $call['action'];
    $method = 'dynamic' . ucfirst((string) $action);
    $call['object'] = $this-&gt;object;</p>
<p>if (isset($this-&gt;handlers[$action])) {…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-c4wf-2xxc-68qm"/>
  </entry>
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