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  <updated>2026-10-04T23:32:18.021459+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63764</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-63764</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T23:32:18.025532+00:00</updated>
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        <p>LMDeploy through 0.14.0, fixed in commit 03c3130, contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the _load_http_url function within the connection.py media handler, where the private-IP guard validates only the original URL without re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a crafted image_url to the chat completions endpoint pointing to an attacker-controlled host that returns a redirect to a private IP or cloud-metadata endpoint, causing the server to follow the redirect and expose internal service content through the model pipeline.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63764"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rqhf-rg9p-w5gg</id>
    <title>GHSA-rqhf-rg9p-w5gg</title>
    <updated>2026-10-04T23:32:18.025713+00:00</updated>
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        <p>lmdeploy's OpenAI-compatible API server contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to access internal services and cloud metadata endpoints by supplying a crafted image_url that redirects to internal targets. Attackers can send a POST request to the chat completions endpoint with an image_url pointing to an attacker-controlled server that responds with an HTTP 302 redirect to internal addresses such as loopback or instance-metadata endpoints, bypassing the initial URL safety check because redirects are followed without re-validating each hop through the safety guard.</p>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rqhf-rg9p-w5gg"/>
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