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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-01T07:42:27.217080+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59714</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-59714</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T07:42:27.220013+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.9.5 before 0.10.0, any authenticated user can overwrite the content of a message in a channel they do not belong to (including private and DM channels) by sending a chat completion request with a channel:-prefixed chat_id and a target message_id. The channel: path routes pipeline output through _make_channel_emitter, which writes to the Messages table using the caller-supplied message_id without binding it to the channel. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-59714"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-x2ff-v5v8-m75m</id>
    <title>GHSA-x2ff-v5v8-m75m — Open WebUI: Cross-channel message overwrite via chat completion API (single-model and multimodel message_ids)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T07:42:27.220100+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Any authenticated user can overwrite the content of a message in a channel they do not belong to (including private and DM channels) by sending a chat completion request with a `channel:`-prefixed `chat_id` and a target `message_id`. The `channel:` path routes pipeline output through `_make_channel_emitter`, which writes to the `Messages` table using the caller-supplied `message_id` without binding it to the channel.</p>
<p>This advisory consolidates two filings of the same flaw: the original single-model form, and a multimodel `message_ids` variant that survives the partial fix shipped in v0.9.6 (see "Fix status" below).</p>
<p>## Details (as introduced in v0.9.5)</p>
<p>When a user submits a chat completion request with a `chat_id` starting with `channel:`, three authorization gaps combined in v0.9.5:</p>
<p>1. **Ownership check skipped** (`main.py`): the `channel:` prefix caused the entire ownership/membership verification block to be skipped, with no channel membership/write check replacing it.</p>
<p>```python
if not chat_id.startswith('local:') and not chat_id.startswith('channel:'):  # temporary/channel chats are not stored
    if is_new_chat:
        ...
    else:
        if not await Chats.is_chat_owner(chat_id, user.id) and user.role != 'admin':
            raise HTTPException(...)
```</p>
<p>2. **Message ID from user input**: `id` (and each value of the multimodel `message_ids` map) comes directly from the request body and is passed as `message_id` to the channel emitter.</p>
<p>3. **Unchecked…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-x2ff-v5v8-m75m"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3605</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3605 — Open WebUI: Cross-channel message overwrite via chat completion API (single-model and multimodel message_ids)</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T07:42:27.220217+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: open-webui</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Any authenticated user can overwrite the content of a message in a channel they do not belong to (including private and DM channels) by sending a chat completion request with a `channel:`-prefixed `chat_id` and a target `message_id`. The `channel:` path routes pipeline output through `_make_channel_emitter`, which writes to the `Messages` table using the caller-supplied `message_id` without binding it to the channel.</p>
<p>This advisory consolidates two filings of the same flaw: the original single-model form, and a multimodel `message_ids` variant that survives the partial fix shipped in v0.9.6 (see "Fix status" below).</p>
<p>## Details (as introduced in v0.9.5)</p>
<p>When a user submits a chat completion request with a `chat_id` starting with `channel:`, three authorization gaps combined in v0.9.5:</p>
<p>1. **Ownership check skipped** (`main.py`): the `channel:` prefix caused the entire ownership/membership verification block to be skipped, with no channel membership/write check replacing it.</p>
<p>```python
if not chat_id.startswith('local:') and not chat_id.startswith('channel:'):  # temporary/channel chats are not stored
    if is_new_chat:
        ...
    else:
        if not await Chats.is_chat_owner(chat_id, user.id) and user.role != 'admin':
            raise HTTPException(...)
```</p>
<p>2. **Message ID from user input**: `id` (and each value of the multimodel `message_ids` map) comes directly from the request body and is passed as `message_id` to the channel emitter.</p>
<p>3. **Unchecked…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-3605"/>
  </entry>
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