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  <updated>2026-10-01T10:58:29.525656+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53607</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-53607</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T10:58:29.528721+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. In versions up to and including 4.30.0, when `prettyUrls: true` is enabled on `@apostrophecms/file` (a documented SEO feature for serving uploaded files at clean URLs), the public pretty-URL handler builds the upstream URL using the raw `Host` HTTP request header. That URL is then `fetch`'ed and the response body + headers are streamed straight back to the requester. Because `Host` is fully attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote attacker can pivot the apostrophe process to issue outbound HTTP requests against any host it can reach on the private network. The path component is constrained to `/uploads/attachments/&lt;cuid&gt;-&lt;slug&gt;.&lt;ext&gt;` (built from a local-DB lookup), which keeps the impact narrow: cross-instance data exfiltration is neutralized by cuid uniqueness, but blind-SSRF residuals remain (network-topology mapping via response-code / timing differences and verbose proxy/WAF 404 body disclosure). As of time of publication, no known patched versions exist.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53607"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-34pj-2622-jvxq</id>
    <title>GHSA-34pj-2622-jvxq — @apostrophecms/file pretty-URL Vulnerable to Unauthenticated SSRF via Host header</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T10:58:29.528835+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: apostrophe</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>When `prettyUrls: true` is enabled on `@apostrophecms/file` (a documented SEO
feature for serving uploaded files at clean URLs), the public pretty-URL
handler builds the upstream URL using the raw `Host` HTTP request header:</p>
<p>```js
proxyUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.get('host')}${uglyUrl}`
```</p>
<p>That URL is then `fetch`'ed and the response body + headers are streamed
straight back to the requester. Because `Host` is fully attacker-controlled,
an **unauthenticated remote** attacker can pivot the apostrophe process to
issue outbound HTTP requests against any host it can reach on the private
network. The path component is constrained to
`/uploads/attachments/&lt;cuid&gt;-&lt;slug&gt;.&lt;ext&gt;` (built from a local-DB lookup),
which keeps the impact narrow: cross-instance data exfiltration is
neutralised by cuid uniqueness, but blind-SSRF residuals remain
(network-topology mapping via response-code / timing differences and
verbose proxy/WAF 404 body disclosure). Verified on `apostrophe@4.30.0`
(latest); no fixed release exists.</p>
<p>- **Affected:** `apostrophe &lt;= 4.30.0` when `@apostrophecms/file` is
  configured with `prettyUrls: true` and uploadfs is **local** (the default;
  S3/CDN deployments produce an absolute `uglyUrl` and are not affected).</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>`modules/@apostrophecms/file/index.js` (excerpt; the public GET route
registered when `prettyUrls: true`):</p>
<p>```js
if (!self.options.prettyUrls) return;
return {
  get: {
    async [`${self.options.prettyUrlDir}/*`](req, res) {…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-34pj-2622-jvxq"/>
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