Wings is the server control plane for Pterodactyl, a free, open-source game server management panel. Prior to 1.12.3, {{config.}} placeholders in egg configuration-file templates allow a low-privileged user to read {{config.token}}, {{config.token_id}}, and {{config.docker.registries}} from the full daemon configuration. This issue is fixed in version 1.12.3.

Affected: Go: github.com/pterodactyl/wings

### Impact

**Type:** Exposure of sensitive information / insufficiently protected credentials leading to privilege escalation and full node compromise.

Wings exposes its **entire** daemon configuration to the egg configuration-file templating engine. When Wings renders a server's configuration files, any `{{config.<path>}}` placeholder in a replacement value is resolved against the full marshalled daemon configuration, with no restriction on which paths may be read.

Because the Panel substitutes **user-controlled** egg variable values into these replacements before sending them to Wings, a low-privileged user can smuggle a `{{config.*}}` placeholder through a variable value. The placeholder is then resolved by Wings and written into a file inside the user's own server, where it can be read via the file manager or SFTP.

This allows reading, among other values:

- `{{config.token}}` - the node's daemon token, which is both the API bearer for   the Panel⇆Wings channel **and** the HMAC signing key for every JWT the node   issues; - `{{config.token_id}}`; - `{{config.docker.registries}}` - configured container-registry credentials.

**Who is impacted:** Any deployment where a user who is not fully trusted can set an egg variable value (e.g. a server owner or a subuser with the `startup.update` permission) **and** the server's egg renders a user-editable variable into a configuration file via `{{server.build.env.*}}`. This pattern is common across stock and community eggs, so…