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  <updated>2026-10-08T13:08:39.659727+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47418</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-47418</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T13:08:41.242722+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-47418"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-943m-6wx2-rc2j</id>
    <title>GHSA-943m-6wx2-rc2j — praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/upd…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T13:08:41.242817+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108.
**Root cause:** identical to the agent and issue IDORs in this codebase. The route accepts `workspace_id` from URL, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls `ProjectService.get(project_id)` which is `session.get(Project, project_id)` — a primary-key-only lookup with no `workspace_id` predicate. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(project_id)` first, inheriting the gap. `get_stats` likewise has no workspace check.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108.</p>
<p>```python
class ProjectService:
    ...</p>
<p>async def get(self, project_id: str) -&gt; Optional[Project]:
        """Get project by ID."""…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-943m-6wx2-rc2j"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2932</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-2932 — praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/upd…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T13:08:41.242937+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`.
**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108.
**Root cause:** identical to the agent and issue IDORs in this codebase. The route accepts `workspace_id` from URL, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls `ProjectService.get(project_id)` which is `session.get(Project, project_id)` — a primary-key-only lookup with no `workspace_id` predicate. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(project_id)` first, inheriting the gap. `get_stats` likewise has no workspace check.</p>
<p>## Affected Code</p>
<p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108.</p>
<p>```python
class ProjectService:
    ...</p>
<p>async def get(self, project_id: str) -&gt; Optional[Project]:
        """Get project by ID."""…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2932"/>
  </entry>
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