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  <updated>2026-10-05T19:02:50.425143+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33493</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-33493</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T19:02:52.052635+00:00</updated>
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        <p>WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `objects/import.json.php` endpoint accepts a user-controlled `fileURI` POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in `.mp4`. Unlike `objects/listFiles.json.php`, which was hardened with a `realpath()` + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the `videos/` directory, `import.json.php` performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user's private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` file on the filesystem, and (3) delete `.mp4` and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process. Commit e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78 contains a patch.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33493"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-83xq-8jxj-4rxm</id>
    <title>GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm — AVideo has a Path Traversal in import.json.php Allows Private Video Theft and Arbitrary File Read/Deletion via fileURI…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T19:02:52.052771+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: wwbn/avideo</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `objects/import.json.php` endpoint accepts a user-controlled `fileURI` POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in `.mp4`. Unlike `objects/listFiles.json.php`, which was hardened with a `realpath()` + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the `videos/` directory, `import.json.php` performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user's private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` file on the filesystem, and (3) delete `.mp4` and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>### Missing path restriction in import.json.php</p>
<p>At `objects/import.json.php:12`, the only validation on the user-supplied `fileURI` is a regex ensuring it ends with `.mp4`:</p>
<p>```php
// objects/import.json.php:12
if (!preg_match("/.*\\.mp4$/i", $_POST['fileURI'])) {
    return false;
}
```</p>
<p>Compare this to the hardened `listFiles.json.php:16-28`, which was patched to restrict paths:</p>
<p>```php
// objects/listFiles.json.php:16-28
$allowedBase = realpath($global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos');
// ...
$resolvedPath = realpath($_POST['path']);
if ($resolvedPath === false || strpos($resolvedPath . '/', $allowedBase) !== 0) {
    http_response_code(403);
    echo json_encode(['error' =&gt; 'Path not allowed']);
    exit;
}
```</p>
<p>The same fix was never applied to `import.json.php`.</p>
<p>### Attack Primitive 1: File con…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-83xq-8jxj-4rxm"/>
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