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  <updated>2026-10-11T21:40:37.246563+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108258</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-108258</title>
    <updated>2026-10-11T21:40:37.535344+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Shiny for Python is a framework for building interactive web applications in Python. From 1.4.0 until 1.6.4, bookmark restore accepts a client-supplied state_id and joins it into the server-side shiny_bookmarks directory without validating that it is a single safe path segment. An unauthenticated request can use parent-directory segments or an absolute path to make the server open input.json and values.json outside the bookmark store, even when bookmark_store is set to disable. In applications configured with bookmark_store set to server and using ui.input_file(), the restore handler can additionally copy and expose an attacker-selected file from an attacker-selected directory. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.4.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-108258"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-47c3-hpmg-7j6p</id>
    <title>GHSA-47c3-hpmg-7j6p — Shiny for Python has path traversal in bookmark restore</title>
    <updated>2026-10-11T21:40:37.535487+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: shiny</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Shiny for Python's bookmark-restore path accepted a client-supplied `_state_id_`
query-string value and joined it into the server-side bookmark directory
(`&lt;cwd&gt;/shiny_bookmarks/&lt;id&gt;`) without validating it. A value containing `..`
path segments, or an absolute path, could therefore cause the server to open and
parse `input.json` and `values.json` from a directory outside the bookmark store.</p>
<p>On a default application the restore was attempted whenever the client supplied a
URL query string — including when bookmarking was disabled
(`bookmark_store="disable"`) — so no opt-in configuration was required. For such
applications the impact is an unauthenticated, server-side probe for the
existence and JSON-validity of attacker-chosen paths, constrained to those two
file names.</p>
<p>Applications configured with `bookmark_store="server"` **and** using
`ui.input_file()` are affected more seriously. The file-input restore handler
copies files out of the restore directory, so the contents of an
attacker-selected file name within an attacker-selected directory could be read
into the application.</p>
<p>### Affected versions</p>
<p>1.4.0 through 1.6.3. Bookmarking was introduced in 1.4.0; earlier releases do
not contain the affected code path and are not affected.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in **1.6.4**. Upgrade with:</p>
<p>```
pip install --upgrade shiny
```</p>
<p>The fix validates bookmark IDs against an allowlist — a single path segment
matching `[A-Za-z0-9_-]+`, which cannot express a path separator, a `…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-47c3-hpmg-7j6p"/>
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